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Introduction
This chapter’s purpose is to explore the room for action which opens for 
schools with the emergence of quality assurance and evaluation policies. Other 
researchers have studied the relationship between schools and policy. For exam-
ple, Tyack and Cuban (1995) have analysed policy reform and policy imple-
mentation in schools; Braun, Maguire & Ball (2010), Braun et al. (2011), and 
Maguire, Braun & Ball (2015) have examined policy enactment in schools; Ball 
and Maroy (2009) have focused on schools’ responses to internal and exter-
nal conditions; and Falabella (2014) has investigated the effects of account-
ability policies within schools. Previous research indicates that the relationship 
between schools and policy is affected by a multitude of objective and subjec-
tive variables. Furthermore, “policy . . . cannot be reduced to an algorithm . . . 
and the school cannot be reduced to policy” (Ball et al. 2011: p. 637). Finally, 
there are “discretionary spaces” in schools “in and beyond policies”, that is, 
spaces policy does not reach because of actors’ agency (teachers’ good ideas or 
alternative solutions), chance, momentum, or the nature of the object or subject 
under the policy radar (Maguire, Braun & Ball 2015: p. 497). The topic is thus 
far from exhausted.
This chapter contributes new perspectives to the study of school reforms. 
First, we approach the relationship between policy and schools through the 
lens of governance theories. As demonstrated in the subsequent section and 
in the book’s other chapters, quality assurance and evaluation (QAE) acts as a 
means of governance, and in this chapter, we scrutinise the local mechanisms 
of this governance through evaluation. Second, our investigation of schools’ 
room for action relies on the analytical framework of CADEP (see Chapters 1 
and 2; also Kauko 2013; Kauko et al. 2012), which prompts us to view schools 
primarily as political actors. CADEP postulates that the key to understanding 
local policy change lies in the analysis of local dynamics: the changing interrela-
tions, intertwinement with different levels, relations between actors and institu-
tions, and the main discursive formations and practices. CADEP analyses three 
dimensions: the political situation, the political possibilities, and the political 
room for action. We are primarily concerned with the room for action or the 
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potential of actors to exploit existing situations and possibilities, and we use the 
theoretical frames of organisational analysis and the concepts of economic and 
symbolic capital to explore schools’ opportunities (or lack of opportunities) in 
respect of QAE.
We start with a description of national QAE policies related to school per-
formance evaluation in Brazil, China, and Russia. These policies create the con-
ditions in which local education authorities govern schools. We then describe 
local governance mechanisms, which we see as key constitutive elements for 
creating the room for action of schools as political actors. Finally, we analyse 
the opening or restricting of schools’ opportunities in this room for action. The 
following questions guide our investigation: 1) How do local authorities utilise 
QAE in governing schools and why and towards what ends do they use QAE? 
2) What are the opportunities which emerge for schools in relation to local 
authorities’ utilisation of QAE?
The following sections present the theories which facilitated data analysis 
and interpretation of results; a description of the case localities in Brazil, China, 
and Russia; and a brief overview of national school performance evaluation 
policies and school-level findings.
QAE in local governance
QAE has become a strategic governance tool in education politics. Its dynam-
ics are therefore manifested across the globe at different levels, from the trans-
national to the local (see Ozga et al. 2011). To analyse how QAE is used in 
local governance, we address three distinctive theories or models of governance 
which stress QAE in specific ways: 1) the “bureaucratic-professional” model of 
governance; 2) new public management; and 3) governance at a distance. We 
briefly describe each in the following paragraphs.
The “bureaucratic-professional” model of governance (Maroy 2008) refers to 
traditional governance models such as formal communication, labour division, 
hierarchical position, standardisation, and emphasis on qualification, specialisa-
tion, and professionalisation, which are commonly associated with the use of 
Weber’s idea of efficient and rational processes to organise and maintain the 
social order (e.g., Weber 2015 [1921]). The general claim of traditional bureau-
cracy is that it is easier to govern rational organisational structures which share 
the same principles as diverse organisations (see also Weber 1949 [1904]). Con-
formity to general rules and the equality of treatment are emphasised.
To ensure quality of education in this governance model, the state issues 
norms, rules, and regulations, and controls the compliance of education organi-
sations and actors to them through such instruments as inspections. Quality of 
education is understood traditionally in terms of teaching quality, which the 
state regulates in cooperation with organised education bodies (for example, 
teacher unions and associations) (Maroy 2008: pp. 15–16). To enhance quality, 
the state organises standardised teacher training and assumes responsibility for 
the provision of sufficient inputs in education institutions.
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New public management (NPM) is a term coined in the late 1980s to 
address the “new” approach to the management of public organisations which 
is inspired by economic rationalism and business practice (see Hood & Jackson 
1991). Its emergence and propagation were intended to improve public service 
efficiency by applying private sector management models to public organisa-
tions (see Osborne & Gaebler 1993). NPM applies an entrepreneurial spirit 
to the public sector, reinforces decentralisation, encourages the use of quasi- 
market structures for governance, and emphasises control of outputs. Citizens 
are regarded as consumers and public servants as managers, providers, or sup-
pliers when corporate governance premises are adopted. These “new” relation-
ships in the political arena and public sphere are regulated by accountability 
regimes and performance management. The latter comprises performance 
standards and evaluation.
In education, responsibility for outcomes shifts to education “service provid-
ers” (schools and teachers), who are guided by national standards. Comparative 
data and instruments such as “best practices” and rankings orient policymaking. 
The state incentivises education providers to improve quality with quasi-market 
mechanisms: the introduction of per capita educational funding, which fosters 
competition between schools, and the implementation of performance-based 
salaries and benefits, which increases competition among school personnel. 
“Consumers” are students and their families, as well as the entire society sup-
porting public education as a common good through taxes. The NPM model 
of education governance endorses accountability and transparency to make 
“consumers” aware of the quality of the service delivered by the “providers”. 
This is accomplished through QAE mechanisms such as external evaluations 
with publicised results assumed to empower consumer choice. The connection 
of evaluation to performance-based funding and salaries accentuates rational 
NPM ideas and produces a constant feedback cycle in which outputs feed 
inputs and vice versa (for a detailed examination of NPM in general education 
see e.g., Gunter et al. 2016).
The third governance model which we employ in our analysis of local 
governments’ QAE use also emerged in the 1980s. Governance at a distance, 
as Chapter 6 described in more detail, departs from traditional governance 
methods (legislation, prohibitions, and regulations) and embraces increased 
autonomy and self-responsibility (Kickert 1995). This is enabled by reliance 
on the power of expertise (see Latour 1987) and implies that actors share a 
significant degree of autonomy based on their will to engage in process and 
conduct (Miller & Rose 1990: p. 14). In this paradigm, processes are not always 
prompted by the centre or government, but by an interrelated network of more 
or less autonomous actors. The most obvious advantage of such a governance 
model is that focus on individual agency diminishes the likelihood of resistance 
to governance measures (Kickert 1995).
QAE procedures contribute to education governance at a distance in sev-
eral ways. Evaluation schemes produce numerical information, used for com-
parison and benchmarking, which becomes the key steering tool (Nóvoa & 
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Yariv-Mashal 2003). QAE policies set and enforce standards against which edu-
cation (education institutions’ service, education staff, and education outcomes) 
is measured, legitimising reward and punishment by government authorities. 
Additionally, QAE increasingly introduces self-evaluation practices. While 
these appear permissive and self-initiated, they need to comply with standard-
ised indicators and central regulations. All these policies and practices implic-
itly emphasise constant self-regulation and self-improvement (Lawn & Grek 
2012: p. 146). Ball (1993: p. 111) suggests “constraints are replaced by incen-
tives”, “prescription is replaced by ex-post accountability based upon quality 
or outcome assessments”, and “coercion is replaced by self-steering [under] 
the appearance of autonomy”. Another way QAE enhances governance at a 
distance is provided by education outcomes in a variety of rankings, ratings, 
indicators, and reports. These are publicised and often prepared by the media 
with the purpose of modulating the decisions and actions of students and their 
parents (e.g., Lingard et al. 2016).
Schools as political actors
We see schools as political actors because they possess at least some degree of 
political power, which enables them to influence education decisions, policies, 
and outcomes. Thus, our analysis of schools’ room for action is informed by 
the political frame of organisational analysis (Bolman & Deal 2013). This lens 
facilitates the interpretation of local data, since it enhances understanding of 
the ways in which schools utilise QAE policies to gain power and resources. 
Within the political frame, education can be viewed as an ecosystem in which 
schools adjust to external pressures and interact with other ecosystem constitu-
ents (local education authority bodies, families, and commercial providers of 
education services) to obtain resources. Bolman and Deal (2013) refer to the 
different resources required by any organisation, such as time, money, and atten-
tion (p. 26) and describe the internal resources connected to an organisation’s 
personnel: people’s skills, attitudes, energy, and commitment (p. 117).
Bolman and Deal (2013) outline multiple sources from which organisational 
actors can obtain power and influence, which are also necessary in the struggle 
for resources. Identifying such sources is useful to an analysis of the political 
interaction between education authorities and schools. For example, local gov-
ernment authorities can be viewed as possessing a coercive power based on the 
ability to legitimately constrain, prohibit, interfere, or punish. Local authorities’ 
power may also be based on the control of rewards – the ability to deliver jobs, 
money, and political support. Concomitantly, schools may draw influence from 
other sources, in particular, from their expertise and reputation, alliances and 
networks, and control of agendas (for a more detailed description of sources of 
power see Bolman & Deal 2013: pp. 225–242).
To broaden the perspective of the resources schools can gain through QAE 
policies, we use the concept of material and symbolic benefits, which stems 
from the distinction between economic and symbolic capital (see Bourdieu 
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1984 [1979]; Bourdieu 1998 [1994]). Bourdieu (2013 [1980]) argues that eco-
nomic and symbolic capital are inextricably combined in the social space; 
one complements and reinforces the benefits of the other. The material ben-
efits schools can obtain through QAE policies are easier to track and meas-
ure, because in most situations, they are connected to government budgets or 
domestic aid programmes. At the same time, not only do individual interests lie 
in the material order, but individuals and organisations aim to enhance sym-
bolic dispositions, such as prestige, status, and honour, in acting in the social 
space (Pinto 2000). The value of symbolic benefits arises from the recognition 
(perception, understanding, and assurance) of relationships established between 
those who possess and utilise symbolic capital (Pinto 2000). Symbolic benefits 
can be obtained from a wide constellation of sources. For example, the achieve-
ment of a top-ranking position in league tables or awareness (through advertis-
ing or other marketing campaigns) of good scores in standardised evaluations 
can afford valuable symbolic benefits to schools.
Case localities
Our data were collected in selected localities in each of the case countries 
through document analysis, interviews, and observations (details on data collec-
tion and analysis are provided in Chapter 2). Given the data collection meth-
odology, our findings are not representative of the countries or localities in 
which our research was undertaken. We aim to reveal the diverse mechanisms 
of QAE policies’ influence and to understand the logic and interests of schools 
concerning performance evaluation mechanisms. However, when analysed 
comparatively, the perspectives of local education practitioners reveal similar 
patterns which are arguably meaningful for a more general analysis of schools’ 
room for action.
In Brazil, the data were collected in the southern state of Santa Catarina 
(population 6.4 million). The state’s social indicators are among the highest in 
the country and across Latin America. Its prosperity derives from its diversi-
fied and industrialised economy. We selected Santa Catarina for our research 
because it has been especially active in the introduction of QAE policies. It is 
the only Brazilian state to order a report from the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the 2010 Programme for Inter-
national Student Assessment (PISA) recognised Santa Catarina as the leader 
in Brazilian QAE. Since 2005, Santa Catarina has attained the highest IDEB 
(Index of Basic Education Development) of all Brazilian states. Interviews and 
observations were conducted in three large public schools (each with around a 
thousand students and fifty teachers) and in key state and municipal education 
organisations.
In Russia, we conducted our local study in the Republic of Chuvashia 
(population 1.3 million), which is approximately 650 kilometres from Mos-
cow. Chuvashia is representative of mid-size, middle-income regions, with 
about half its population of non-Russian ethnicities. The region has a 
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well-developed QAE system which has received positive reviews from exter-
nal evaluators and is often presented as an example of best practice at training 
sessions for QAE professionals (Bochenkov 2013). The World Bank guided 
the education reforms implemented in the republic. Our local case from Chu-
vashia is Cheboksary, a city of half a million and the capital of the republic, 
as well as the centre from which all regional QAE initiatives originate. We 
collected this chapter’s interview and observation data primarily from two 
public schools in the same city district, as well as from municipal education 
organisations.
Local data collection in China followed a different pattern because of schools’ 
restricted accessibility. Intensive school observations were not allowed, so our 
analysis relies solely on data from interviews with school principals and deputy 
principals conducted in seven schools from two provinces in Northern China. 
One province belongs to a well-developed region. New education reforms are 
being piloted and tested in the locality, making it one of the most advanced 
areas in adopting national QAE policies. The other, situated on the coast, can 
be described as moderately developed, with an income level slightly above the 
Chinese average. Although it has a reputation for producing competitive stu-
dents, it is neither labelled nor known in China as the most active or pioneering 
in innovating and implementing education reform. While the process of QAE 
policy introduction varies across different provinces, here the policy has been 
adopted moderately quickly. The schools visited in the two provinces varied 
greatly in their history, ranking positions, and student bodies. We conducted 
interviews at different types of schools with the goal of obtaining greater diver-
sity in interviewees’ positions and opinions.
The rise of school performance evaluation  
in Brazil, China, and Russia
In each country, new evaluation instruments measuring students’, schools’, and 
teachers’ performance have recently been added to the traditional QAE system 
(Chapter 3 discussed the development of national QAE systems in detail). In 
Brazil, such performance evaluation instruments are the SAEB (Basic Education 
Evaluation System) and the IDEB (Index of Basic Education Development); in 
Russia, they are the national examinations (GIA), which assess students’ educa-
tion outcomes after grades 9 and 11; in China, they are the NAEQ (National 
Assessment of Education Quality), which assesses students’ academic achieve-
ment in grades 4 and 8.
Education statistics – or the “school census” – in Brazilian education began 
in 1931. The collection of statistics was gradually decentralised to the Brazil-
ian states, which then sent a compiled data set to the federal government. The 
SAEB was introduced in 1990. It consists of two principal biannual assessments 
of maths (problem solving) and Portuguese (reading), one involving a sample of 
pupils in both primary and secondary schools, the other applying to all pupils 
in public schools registered in grades 5 and 9 and popularly known as Prova 
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Brasil. SAEB results are used in calculating the IDEB, alongside school flow data 
(progression, retention, and dropout rates) provided by the school census. This 
indicator was created in 2007 to measure the quality of each school, municipal-
ity, and state and the overall quality of national education.
The SAEB is claimed to contribute to the improvement of education qual-
ity and the universalisation of school access by subsidising policy formulation, 
reformulation, and monitoring (INEP 2016). It is intended to enable a bet-
ter understanding of the variables which influence pupils’ performance. The 
SAEB is also intended to increase participation of parents and society in educa-
tion (Brasil 1988, 1996, 2007, 2014). Finally, researchers envision the SAEB as 
an instrument to enhance local education management at sub-national levels 
(Machado & Alavarse 2014).
The SAEB and IDEB are national policies. However, Brazilian states and 
municipalities, which are the country’s major providers of public education, 
have the autonomy to develop their own student performance evaluations, and 
use them differently for simple comparison, diagnosis, school and staff accredi-
tation, and performance-based remuneration. Around twenty states (Brooke, 
Cunha, & Faleiros 2011) and more than 1,500 municipalities (Bauer, Pimenta, 
Horta Neto, & Sousa 2015) coordinate a standardised evaluation in addition 
to the SAEB. All evaluation mechanisms in primary and secondary educa-
tion, except for university entrance examinations (vestibular and ENEM), are 
low-stakes.
In 2007, however, the school census started to investigate student and teacher 
data, comprising data about school infrastructure, docents, enrolment, school 
hours, and school flow by level, stage, and type of education. The school census 
is a reference for calculating public school funding as well as for managing sev-
eral federal programmes. Besides being responsible for the collection of these 
reports, the principals of several Brazilian public schools are also accountable for 
the fulfilment of action plans derived from management projects they presented 
when they were elected.
In China, education supervision comprising administrative and education 
inspections plays a major role in school quality assurance as a sub-system which 
complements local education governance. The supervision service collects sta-
tistical information on schools and ensures that education policies and plans are 
implemented by schools as expected. Local governments provide schools with 
funding, salaries, in-service training, and promotion for school staff based on 
this information.
In 2007, China introduced a new national assessment of education quality 
(NAEQ), employing standardised testing as a supplement to education supervi-
sion, which resembles international large-scale assessments, such as PISA, and 
Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) (NAEQ 
2015). The NAEQ evaluates students’ achievement in Chinese, mathemat-
ics, and science. It also includes indicators of students’ physical and mental 
health and socio-economic conditions. Assessment results are accumulated in a 
national database to inform policymaking. Performance data are also circulated 
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among local education actors. The report is delivered by the NAEQ’s national 
centre to avoid different provinces or localities competing with each other, 
and it aims to provide comprehensive information to policymakers so they can 
learn the real level of educational development and problems in schools. The 
performance report is sample-based, and since 2015, all Chinese provinces and 
municipalities have received an annual assessment.
As China has a long history of ranking the quality of education with exami-
nation scores or other administrative methods, this new model of testing, along 
with the popularisation of student-centred pedagogy, is expected to use qual-
ity evaluation to reduce ranking and ruthless competition in schools. China’s 
ten-year blueprint for education development between 2010 and 2020 (State 
Council 2010) outlines the central government’s intention to renew and 
upgrade evaluation practice at all levels. Nevertheless, at the local level, school 
quality is largely defined by students’ examination scores, which determine 
their opportunities to enter the next education levels. The scores thus remain 
parents’ primary concern.
In Russia, the traditional instruments of quality control in school education 
are inspections and school reports. Until 2009, school-leaving examinations 
were conducted by each school, supervised by the local education authorities. 
Examination, end-of-quarter, and end-of-year grades served as the main indi-
cator of students’ educational achievement. Policymaking was also informed 
by statistical information on school facilities, teacher qualifications, and student 
numbers. These data and grades assigned by schools are still included as indica-
tors in the quality evaluation system. However, they are complemented by data 
from diverse large-scale assessments of student achievement and largely from 
national examinations.
National examinations were introduced in the 2000s as a key element of the 
newly developed system of evaluation and quality control in education. Their 
introduction was a way to ensure the “unity of educational space” across the 
diverse country, and at the same time, these standardised tests were to produce 
statistics on education quality for more informed policymaking. Finally, at the 
time of its introduction, the national test was acknowledged as a strong measure 
of equality and quality improvement (Bolotov 2004).
The Unified State Exam (USE, or GIA-11) is sat on completion of the 
eleven-grade school education, and the State Final Attestation (SFA, or GIA-9) 
is undertaken in grade 9, the last grade of general education. Examinations test 
graduates’ knowledge in two compulsory subjects (Russian and mathematics) 
and several chosen subjects. Passing the tests is necessary to obtain a gradua-
tion certificate and apply for the next level of education. Contents of the tests 
are developed independently of schools in connection with the compulsory 
state curriculum. Scores in both tests serve as the main indicators of education 
quality in national and regional policy documents on quality assurance, school 
rankings, teacher performance evaluation metrics, and even (until 2015) assess-
ments of regional administrations’ effectiveness (Piattoeva 2015). Thus, national 
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examinations carry high stakes for all involved in education: students and par-
ents, school workers, and the education authorities.
Local governance of schools through  
quality evaluation and assurance
The room for action of schools as political actors is conditioned by local edu-
cation authorities’ use of evaluation procedures. In each of our case localities, 
diverse control and governance measures are applied to schools based on perfor-
mance. In considering the whole range of traditional and new QAE procedures 
implemented in each locality, we focus on developments in local governance 
models inspired by the introduction of performance evaluation instruments. 
Our data analysis was informed by the three theoretical models of governance 
described at the beginning of this chapter; our interviewees’ specific accounts 
or other indicators in our research data caught our attention, because they were 
characteristic of a particular governance model. At the same time, we sought to 
reflect the complexity of local governance realities in our findings, not limiting 
them to models but enriching the understanding provided by a combination of 
the three theoretical devices.
The governance practices this section describes are those mentioned by our 
respondents, presented in the local policy documents we analysed, or which we 
observed in the localities. Hence, “Brazil”, “Russia”, and “China” in this sec-
tion simply label the source of data and should not be taken to imply that the 
attributed governance practices are consistent across the countries.
Evaluation as an indirect intervention
In accordance with national discourses on evaluation and quality improvement, 
by introducing new evaluation procedures, local authorities seek to change school 
management and teaching methods without direct interference. Evaluation is 
regarded as a means of reorienting school staff to different aims more aligned 
with national education priorities and encouraging school management and 
teachers to devote extra effort to improvement. In all observed localities, schools 
were required to regularly produce specific documents in which they declared 
their goals and evaluated their progress (in Brazil this was labelled “action plans”; 
in China, “self-regulation”; and in Russia, “self-evaluation reports” and “plans for 
the improvement of the effectiveness of learning”). In other words, local author-
ities use QAE procedures to ensure and stimulate schools’ self-improvement, 
based on the assumption that schools would probably not do this on their own.
Both the internal evaluation process, which requires an action plan, and 
the external evaluation process should demand action plans in order to 
overcome the appointed limitations and difficulties . . . We want to make 
schools commit to start discussing evaluation, discussing self-evaluation, 
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its own resources, what is more important, what is better, ideal, because if 
nobody discusses anything, nothing will be taken into account, and hardly 
anybody will do it. School management, for instance, has a huge commit-
ment and in the end, induces this. In case it doesn’t, everything gets very 
loose . . . And that’s how the human being is . . . The teacher lets the routine 
get loose, students also get loose . . . [when the teacher] does not demand, 
does not require people to take some position . . . – then we know [what 
happens – a pessimistic scenario results].
(BR-S-11)
Attention is paid to school staff ’s ability to work with data. By training teachers 
to produce and analyse evaluation data, authorities expect them to become bet-
ter informed of their students’ learning gaps and to close them more successfully:
A teacher should be able to work with feedback, which means to do tests, 
to encourage advanced learning . . . The problem is how to know, or, rather, 
how to influence what happens in the classroom, because the teacher needs 
to know what he or she is teaching.
(RU-M-2)
Stimulation of the production and management of data in schools is intended 
to improve staff ’s reflexivity and critical thinking and direct their attention to 
problems the authorities deem important. For example, a Russian interviewee 
said that one of the aims of evaluation was to make schools pay more atten-
tion to low-performing students (RU-M-2). In China, it is hoped that new 
evaluation will loosen the current overarching emphasis on examination results 
and redirect attention to students’ well-being in schools and in their general 
learning context (State Council 2010). Evaluation is perceived not simply as 
a new tool but as a new way of thinking, an “evaluation culture” (BR-S-11), 
which should permeate schools’ main practices, from planning and managing 
to classroom practice.
We have documents and bulletins that are specific to the principal, which 
give him a different view in relation to these indicators. We have bulletins 
for teachers, and there is one that students take home to their parents . . . 
We invite 150 professionals to participate in workshops because we want 
them to be able to get all the knowledge, not only know how to read a 
Prova Brasil result, but to make them qualified to do a specific analysis of 
the results, and willing to know the indicators . . . Our main objective is 
to strengthen this view, to enlarge this view and to make them gain more 
benefit from what is available today.
(BR-M-2)
We have never thought that context indicators can be used, for example, 
to introduce some new things, to form new administrative structure in 
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schools, for example. [In schools] they are already interested to ensure that 
information is collected, so a [special] deputy principal is appointed who 
supervises evaluations . . . Also new deputy principals for primary educa-
tion are appearing. Previously, not all schools had them, but now there are 
all-Russia tests [vserossiiskie proverochnie raboty, national tests at the primary 
level], so there is a new [administrative position].
(RU-M-2)
Some of our interviewees from schools in Brazil and Russia expressed scepti-
cism of the authorities’ declared intention to foster improvement in schools. 
They regarded the “improvement through evaluation” discourse as a disguise 
for the authorities’ real intention, which was to shift all responsibility for quality 
to schools and teachers. Numbers inadequately represented quality of educa-
tion, school actors explained, and if the authorities were sincerely concerned 
about quality and the situation in schools, they would “come and see” instead 
of calculating indexes. This view was shared by an interviewee from the Rus-
sian local authorities:
When schools submit reports, [numerical] analysis, we still look at . . . what 
problems reveal themselves [in these reports]. We understand that we need 
to go and visit these educational institutions, we should see and help them 
in this respect . . . After national examinations we worked through all [iden-
tified problematic] issues with every [school] administration, we created a 
whole schedule of meetings with administrations, yes, we worked overtime 
for a week with our schools, discussed where the gaps are in those institu-
tions, what to do to eliminate the gaps.
(RU-M-1)
This illustrates that authorities question the adequacy of data and numerical 
evaluation tools for quality assurance. The next section explains in more detail 
how evaluation is connected to other governance instruments.
Justification of reward and punishment
School inspections based on performance evaluation were common in our 
observed localities in China and Russia and are under discussion in Brazil. 
The functions of such inspections include identifying problems contributing 
to unsatisfactory school performance, demanding schools develop plans for 
improvement, and in some cases, applying sanctions. In Russia, inspections are 
authorised to issue fines and even suspend school licences. In China, schools’ 
failure to meet performance standards may also have severe consequences. 
A first failure means the school will be disqualified from annual rewards, and 
a principal’s promotion may be deferred. Teachers may lose the opportunity 
to pass their annual appraisal and gain promotion. If a school continues to fail 
within a given time, it may be suspended or closed. However, such extreme 
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decisions are very rare and usually apply to “low-quality” schools. In public 
schools in both China and Russia, the principal’s suspension is another poten-
tial consequence if the school consistently underperforms. Although such harsh 
measures prescribed by inspectors are relatively rare, the possibility of such 
measures places great pressure on schools to avoid poor results in performance 
evaluation. Inspection itself can function as a form of punishment or threat, 
even when high stakes for school administration are not attached to it, which 
we witnessed in Brazil.
Respondent: If there are some problematic issues, they need to be identified, to 
be demonstrated.
Interviewer: And what support was offered to schools that had many problems?
Respondent: Well, there were not many of them, in practice . . . In some, the 
directorate was changed (RU-M-2).
Nobody wants to receive the external commission, which is a commission 
created by the [sub-national authority] that goes to the school to check 
what led to a low IDEB in that school . . . This process will induce every-
one to grow, everyone to increase [IDEB], always, because nobody wants 
to have the thirty lowest [IDEB scores and be inspected].
(BR-S-11)
Performance evaluation also facilitates governance through diverse mechanisms 
which link evaluation results to provision of resources. First, evaluation can 
justify distribution of funds, including performance-based funding and salaries, 
project funding, and grants. Salaries of Russian school administrators and teach-
ers contain a performance-based element. In the Russian case, locality students’ 
GIA results are also considered in school and teacher contests and as criteria for 
participation in special projects involving extra funding.
We had an indicator connected to student absence in schools. Currently 
we still have it, but then we made a specific emphasis on it, we made 
[schools] watch these numbers more attentively. It was our goal to stimu-
late them with this criterion so that they would improve the situation. For 
example, if her or his salary depends on the improvement of this indicator, 
then . . . there is a motivation for the manager to work on it.
(RU-M-2)
A Russian school principal reports,
The municipal Department of Education demands a certain percentage 
[of high grades which the school students need to obtain]. If we do not 
provide the required quality, it means that we produce pedagogical defects. 
Our funding is decreased then. . . . We could not even apply for some 
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grants, because only schools without students with a criminal record could 
apply, and we have such students.
(RU-S-2)
In Brazil, high performance is not the only route to resources, as there are 
also national and sub-national government programmes for providing low-
performing schools with financial and technical support. Bonus funding to 
high-performing schools in some Brazilian regions is provided to reward 
staff performance, and some schemes function under which high-performing 
schools become sponsors and advisors of low-performing schools to improve 
the local education system’s overall performance. In China, different localities 
have different traditions of encouraging schools to achieve better results in 
college entrance examinations. An interviewee reported of certain localities, 
“They give a bonus to some schools depending on how many students are 
recruited by Qinghua University or Peking University, or how many students 
are recruited by top universities” (CN-P-01).
In Russia and China, performance evaluation results count in awarding qualifi-
cations and honoured status to administrators and teachers. In Russia, professional 
qualification and status influence salary levels and are also crucial for professional 
recognition. In China, they are not connected to remuneration, but as symbolic 
rewards, they are highly valued, as a Chinese school inspector explained,
The punishment of a teacher who, for example, failed the moral evaluation, 
is that he or she cannot participate in teacher promotion in this year; he 
or she would not participate in the selection of honoured teachers. This is 
quite a severe punishment for a teacher. Think about that, if as a teacher 
you could not get promoted or become an honoured teacher because of a 
moral problem, how can you gain trust from students and parents?
(CN-S-05)
In all three case countries, low-performing schools are offered support in the 
form of supervision and training for teachers or peer assistance in teaching. 
However, some interviewees from schools regarded this practice not as support 
for teaching methods but as symbolic punishment, which labelled such schools 
and teachers as incompetent.
They [the local authorities] came up with a very “interesting” project. For 
example, one subject teacher in our school got six fails in GIA results [six 
students from his/her class failed in the subject examination]. And this class 
is to be visited by another teacher who had no fails, so that he/she can 
conduct the preparation-for-GIA lessons with the students of this class. 
What is the implementation of this project going to demonstrate? That 
this teacher [the one who had fails] did not do his/her work, and another 
lady now comes – oh so smart, look, children! So, what image of this class’s 
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teacher is this project going to create? Do they think of it at all? And this 
[intervention by a different teacher] is not going to work, in just one week, 
because students do most for the teachers they know and love.
(RU-SM-4)
The practice of using performance evaluation as justification for reward and 
punishment does not always mean that authorities implement evidence-based 
policy. Sometimes decisions about reward or punishment come before evalu-
ation results, which are subsequently used as justification for decisions. This 
mainly concerns evaluations in the form of inspections but is sometimes 
applied to numerical performance evaluations. A Russian interviewee told us 
that a ranking based on numerical indicators was considered inaccurate by a 
supervising authority because it contradicted the authority’s opinion of who 
should occupy the top of the ranking:
Last year we tried to rank administrators based on the indicators given by 
the [regional] Ministry [of Education] . . . This was . . . even a small argu-
ment, you couldn’t call this a conflict, but just an argument about “why you 
have chosen the wrong school [as ranking leaders].
(RU-M-2)
In Brazil, some school interviewees perceived that evaluation criteria had been 
developed to accommodate political interests and produce better results.
I see that the main role of external evaluation is to manipulate indexes, 
manipulate a situation so public schools look as if they . . . have good 
conditions. I see that there is a clear lowering of education [standards] in 
public schools, and this [is] veiled [by politicians, otherwise they will not 
be elected] . . . That’s when the index is essential.
(BR-MS-1)
Accountability of authorities
Local authorities themselves are subject to evaluation and sanctions because 
they occupy an intermediary position between schools and the sub-national 
and national levels. Local officials need to demonstrate that they are success-
fully implementing national and sub-national regulations and doing something 
about schools’ identified problems. In other words, local authorities undertake 
evaluations to report to their own supervisors.
Since 2009 we have established a notification system of supervision results. 
The results [are] included as one of the main indicators of the county 
government performance to offer evidence for reward or punishment . . . 
Moreover, the problems that have been found in a previous inspection will 
be put into the special checking list [for] next year.
(CN-M-02)
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It is therefore in local officials’ best interest to ensure that schools pass inspec-
tions. A Russian interviewee reported,
Supervision authorities visit [schools] quite often, be it [the] prosecutor’s 
office or the Department for Supervision and Control in Education. They 
take a certain aspect and review it. But before they visit I have already assigned 
a specialist for this task; she goes in advance and, together with the school, 
checks all the documents. [She] also observes lessons, because sometimes 
there are [federal] tests in different subjects. She, so to say, prepares schools for 
these inspections. And when the Department for Supervision and Control 
comes, she is there with them and polishes (otrabatyvaet) certain issues.
(RU-M-1)
A Chinese respondent explained that the need for local inspections arose from 
other evaluations:
Lots of evaluation of schools is still based on school [graduates’] per-
formance in college entrance examination results. Schools might go to 
another extreme to [devote] all the time to the examined subjects. Many 
schools don’t even teach the subjects not tested. So, supervision makes sure 
that no such actions happen in schools.
(CN-S-01)
With the lack of supervision and inspection in Brazil, sub-national govern-
ments tend to use teacher training to ensure the curriculum has been followed 
and the evaluation culture has spread.
Local authorities are also accountable to the public, especially parents, so 
authorities use QAE instruments to demonstrate their work and schools’ qual-
ity to the local community. At the same time, evaluation serves as a means by 
which authorities involve community actors in the governance or support of 
schools. For example, both Brazilian legislation and public opinion call for the 
participation of community and families in education and, in a context of high 
social inequality, voluntary work and donations often target low-performing 
schools. The authorities thus view evaluation as a tool to provide relevant 
information on schools to the community; evaluation needs “to reflect the real-
ity of education . . . [and] raise [the] involvement [of community members in] 
schools” (BR-S-9). In Russia, some local quality assurance measures, including 
inspections, are implemented in response to parents’ complaints. Self-evaluation 
reports prepared by Russian schools are also published to provide parents and 
the public with information about school quality. Chinese interviewees also 
mentioned that evaluation and inspection in some localities involve parents, 
the district community, and the media: “We [inspectors] interview students 
and parents, and then the community around the school. We also view the 
school archives, and then assess the implementation of rectification, [and] do [a] 
follow-up investigation” (CN-M-01).
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Schools’ room for action in QAE
Local authorities’ use of QAE in Brazil, China, and Russia to govern schools 
sets schools’ room for action in their localities. Remembering the aims and 
actions of authorities described in the previous section, we now proceed to 
an analysis of school administrators’ and teachers’ reactions. In this section, we 
seek to answer our second research question: what are the opportunities which 
emerge for schools in relation to local authorities’ utilisation of QAE? We 
look at schools’ opportunities as political actors – their opportunities to obtain 
power and resources. For this analysis, we employ the typology of the sources of 
power (Bolman & Deal 2013), which emphasises the diversity of such sources 
(or kinds of power). We consider not only material but also the symbolic 
resources schools can obtain, and focus on both those who gain and those who 
lose power and resources because of changing QAE policies.
Evaluation as an internal management tool
Some school administrators in Brazil and Russia eagerly embrace evaluation 
as an effective management instrument. They see comparison as a “natural 
way of human thinking” (RU-S-3 and BR-SS1) and use both traditional and 
new evaluation tools to encourage their teachers, students, and parents to work 
harder to get better results. Schools can refer to evaluation data at staff meetings 
to set goals for the upcoming period, identify student groups requiring extra 
attention, and praise high-performing teachers and scold low-performers. One 
of the Russian schools we observed organised an internal ranking of teachers 
based on their students’ performance and regularly designed contests for stu-
dents and staff members.
The internal quality control [vnutrishkol’nyi kontrol’, a traditional proce-
dure involving regular lesson observations and peer discussions] is the main 
thing! I always tell deputy principals: you can postpone anything, but do 
the internal control! One should reveal a problem in time and solve it 
quickly, then you will have good quality in the end. For example, in one 
grade 8 group students suddenly started getting fail marks. It turned out 
that their former teacher worked insufficiently, and the deputy principal 
didn’t find it out in time. So, I went teaching . . . that group, we cleaned a 
little bit [“cleaning” means getting rid of low-performing students, primar-
ily by persuading them to transfer to another school], and in grade 9 they 
passed national examinations more or less satisfactorily, though there were 
still five fails in that . . . group.
(RU-S-1)
When I see the IDEB, the first thing I do is to compare my school with 
others – I use all data. . . . I compare with other schools . . . [in the neigh-
bourhood] in order to understand, because the region has similar socio-
economic characteristics, so we can compare. This is natural and for me, 
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indexes, numbers, they have a meaning . . . I always use the indexes in the 
beginning of [the] school year in our pedagogical meetings. One of the 
first things I do is to show the indexes. Both the IDEB and other general 
indexes and government measures, as well as our internal indexes, reten-
tion, and dropout indexes, and what we will do in order to keep students 
at our school.
(BR-SS-1)
In China, our respondents mentioned various school initiatives such as the cre-
ation of extracurricular classes which were launched to gain additional scores 
in external evaluations. We witnessed no example of the appropriation of new 
QAE tools for internal school purposes.
Schools’ room for action in relation to resources
The connection between evaluation results and resource distribution allows 
some schools and school workers to benefit from the new QAE system. 
Some interviewees said that students’ high performance could secure the 
 performance-based element of a salary (in Russia and in some Brazilian 
localities) and the obtaining of higher qualifications (in Russia and China). 
Low performance was perceived by our Russian and Chinese respondents as 
a potential threat to securing necessary funding, which we did not observe in 
Brazil, where low performers tended to receive assistance rather than punish-
ment. Although Brazilian schools can obtain resources if they perform poorly 
in evaluation schemes, maintaining low scores in national and sub-national 
standardised tests is far from becoming a strategy for such schools to supply 
their needs. In Russia, where examination results carry high stakes for students, 
schools can also attract additional financial resources by offering exam prepa-
ration classes for a fee.
The principal very actively encourages additional paid-for classes. In grades 
9 and 11 they are not really voluntary, and in other grades they are also 
strongly recommended to students, because it is very important for the 
school budget.
(RU-S-26)
Schools’ high performance also indirectly creates opportunities to obtain better 
resources. First, it helps to attract better teachers, because salaries, career devel-
opment, and reputation depend on performance evaluation results. It also helps 
to attract performance-oriented students. In Russia, schools receive per capita 
funding, so having more students is financially beneficial. This also applies to 
non-public schools in China (“non-public” includes expensive private schools 
and cheaper non-government schools, such as Minban schools):
School reputation is very important to us. Even if there were no inspec-
tion from the government, we would still do our best to improve quality 
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because unlike public schools, our lives . . . [depend] on students and how 
many students come here.
(CN-MBS-01)
Reputation and influence
School performance is converted into school reputation through unofficial media 
rankings (in all three countries), public self-evaluation reports (in Russia and 
China), and participation in contests and projects conditioned by performance 
(in all localities). A good reputation is itself valuable, as was frequently emphasised 
by our Chinese interviewees. It also motivates school personnel and students. 
A Russian teacher explained why high performance in examinations was impor-
tant: “It is our school’s prestige, and parents expect it from us, and my reputation 
in the city – I want to support it, not to lose it” (RU-S-27). Creating a good 
reputation and visibility is a long-term strategy to attract resources and influence:
You [as a school] should participate in contests, be visible, so that they [the 
authorities] see you, remember you afterwards. There are contests such as 
“Teacher of the Year” – we cannot hope to win . . . those. But there are so 
many different contests, you can find one that does not depend on results [of 
students so much], in which you can win, if you read the criteria attentively . . . 
Piloting [of federal or regional educational initiatives] – they [the authorities] 
don’t give it to any [random] school. And if a school participates in piloting, if 
it organises city and regional seminars – the teachers [of this school] can then 
mention it in their qualification documents or in grant applications.
(RU-S-4)
Through participation in projects, contests, and so on, school administrations 
develop networks and coalitions which eventually help the school to infor-
mally influence education decisions and resource distribution. Another infor-
mal channel for schools’ local and even regional influence is through influential 
parents of students, teachers (especially honoured teachers), or any prominent 
figure’s participation in school activities (for example, war veterans participating 
in patriotic upbringing, sports champions invited to school competitions, or 
local business leaders invited to graduation events). Demonstrating high perfor-
mance and creating local and regional visibility allows schools to attract power-
ful people to their informal networks.
The head of [the] city administration called me and reprimanded me: 
“Why do you solve your problems through veterans?” – but I didn’t! We 
just invited this veteran, and he was in three wars, he is 96 years old, he met 
with Putin, we regularly invited him to school events, so he also wants to 
do something for us. He asks what we need, and we haven’t yet got [good 
sports facilities].
(RU-S-1)
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Our observations in all three localities provided examples of schools with strong 
performance-based reputations which acted as “consultants” or “best practice 
providers” in their locality. In some cases, local education authorities delegated 
power to top-performing schools by making them official providers of exper-
tise and advice (noted in all three countries).
The school that receives the bonus [for their high performance, in a scheme 
that is still under discussion] must, as . . . compensation, offer some support, 
as . . . [a] “sister school” to each school that hasn’t been able to achieve the 
goal, in order to allow them to grow together.
(BR-S-01)
To be frank, our [school’s] quality and standards . . . have exceeded those 
required by the inspection and evaluation. I think the function [of inspec-
tors] to “guide and supervise” is [less applicable] to us, unlike weak schools 
that are supervised and guided by education inspection. Schools like ours 
are more of an example and something to be exported.
(CN-S-01)
Low-performing schools’ room for action
The interdependence of financial, human, and symbolic resources leads to a 
situation where school performance evaluation results sustain a virtuous cycle 
of resource accumulation for high-performing schools and a vicious cycle for 
low performers, who are increasingly disadvantaged because of their students’ 
poor results. Teachers in these schools cannot improve their qualifications, as 
they have few if any high-performing students. Hence, it is harder for schools 
to attract new teachers, not only because career opportunities are bleak but 
because work itself can be more demanding and less emotionally rewarding. 
There are also fewer opportunities to win in contests; in some cases, schools 
cannot even apply if their previous performance is poor.
It can be so that a teacher does not participate in any contests, but 
can explain well, is a good teacher . . . I wish they would abolish those 
[ performance-based principles of calculating] salaries, they only provoke 
conflict. Or . . . [define] criteria in a different way, or . . . give it to the 
school, so that we could ourselves evaluate our teachers.
(RU-S-2)
Implementation of QAE procedures is regulated, so schools have no option but 
to comply with them.
As for the documents [regulations] coming from above, some of them 
are very concrete, they are very comprehensive, for example, there are 
over forty items in the students’ quality education regulations for school 
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operations pushed forward by the province level. We cannot violate [any] 
of them, otherwise there will be punishments [for] us.
(CN-S-06)
Once every three years we have inspections, you know, [to see] whether we 
work in accordance with the licence, with the accreditation.
If our institution somehow violates some norms, we may lose our 
accreditation, we may lose our licence. Hence all these monitoring studies 
[monitoringi], self-evaluation reports, all these different reports [exist] – all 
this is just so that the institution works as it should work by law.
(RU-S-2)
Complying with regulations and government priorities, as well as improving 
numerically measured performance, carries high stakes even for well-established 
schools. The Brazilian data provided an example of how a supervising authority 
restricted resource access to a medium-performing school because it was pur-
suing its own principles in managing education (retaining low-performing stu-
dents and those who did not reach the minimum required school attendance).
I had to go to the Education Secretariat in the evening . . . to take the 
documentation, a process of around two or three hundred pages, to prove 
we did it right . . . I was, in some way, harassed during the meeting to 
override teachers’ decisions . . . to change the results of the teachers’ 
meeting that retained around thirty students . . . under the allegation that 
this [retention of students] would lower the school index [IDEB] . . . 
With an intimidating speech [they said] “If you have any projects going 
on at school and the IDEB is [ongoing], and you are retaining students 
and the IDEB decreases . . . we will end . . . all these projects, we will 
close your labs.
(BR-MS-1)
While this Brazilian school openly resisted new evaluation policy and con-
fronted the authorities, in China and Russia, we witnessed no example of 
schools refusing to comply with QAE policies or openly questioning them. 
However, evaluations may be resisted in hidden ways; in both Brazil and Rus-
sia, our respondents mentioned that evaluation results could be fabricated and 
that it was to some extent possible to retain traditional practices while formally 
implementing new regulations.
I believe it is illusory to think that there is total control through the [exter-
nal] evaluations. Lots of schools and teachers find ways to manipulate the 
dynamics, including making the evaluation look better than what . . . the 
students answered . . . in the evaluation.
(BR-MS-2)
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Conclusion
A comparative study of local practice in Brazil, China, and Russia reveals that 
local governance through QAE is more multifaceted in all three countries than 
is nationally envisioned. The enacted QAE policies and their effects on schools 
do not stay within the limits outlined by policymakers. QAE instruments, such 
as large-scale assessments, and the data they produce are reinterpreted locally 
in accordance with existing practices of quality control and school governance 
and are biased towards the political interests of local actors who seek resources 
and power. The opening or restriction of political opportunities for schools 
therefore also seem to differ from national policies’ original intentions. We 
demonstrate that a combination of governance theories, rather than one theory, 
is needed to understand the diverse ways in which QAE policies can enhance 
and change local governance. We also argue that the study of schools’ political 
room for action constitutes an important dimension in the investigation of local 
policy effects.
We identify several ways in which local education authorities can use QAE 
for governance. First, by evaluating schools and training them to work with 
data, local authorities seek to change internal school processes, make schools set 
specific goals, and focus on problems they have identified. They also anticipate 
that schools will adopt a new regime of constant self-improvement and an 
evaluation culture and that teachers and administrators will inform themselves 
in new ways (by collecting and processing quantitative data) about students’ 
learning gaps. Such aspirations are representative of governance at a distance, 
which aims to change subjects’ behaviour through constant surveillance and 
their “voluntarily” committing to act in accordance with government designs.
Local authorities also use evaluation in connection with traditional con-
trol measures (inspections, restrictions, fines, appointing and dismissing school 
administrations) to justify political decisions. QAE thus reinforces authorities’ 
control over schools. Evaluation also provides the ground for resource distribu-
tion (financial, material, and human) and access to rewards: performance-based 
funding and salaries, higher qualifications, and prestigious status. The provi-
sion of incentives to comply with new regulations, while allowing subjects a 
degree of operational freedom, characterises a governance model based on new 
public management. We found that some schools’ local governance QAE prac-
tices could be viewed as “micro-level NPM”, while QAE mechanisms shifted 
responsibility for quality from local authorities to schools.
In these ways, QAE policies can enhance traditional governance instruments, 
create new connections between implementation of regulations and provision 
of resources, and facilitate greater access to schools’ internal processes, formalis-
ing them and subjecting them to authorities’ control. QAE tools can also help 
local authorities to demonstrate their own efficiency in supervising organisa-
tions, to be accountable to the public, and to change interactions between 
schools, authorities, and the community.
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Brazilian, Chinese, and Russian schools are implementing QAE policies to 
comply with national and sub-national legislation and as a response to the gov-
ernance measures we have described. Compliance with QAE policies opens 
exclusive access to various resources and powers to high-performing schools. 
Apart from utilising the “official” schemes of resource accumulation (per capita 
funding, performance-based salaries, improving teacher qualifications), schools 
may find ways to use QAE instruments to attract additional resources from 
students and parents. Improved visibility through participation in contests and 
rankings allows schools to assume new roles as experts and providers of best 
practice and to attract affluent people to their networks and thus increase their 
local influence, which facilitates further accumulation of resources. Reputa-
tion occupies a central position in our analysis because it functions as both a 
symbolic resource and a source of power. We observe that reputation is key to 
virtuous (in the case of high-performing schools) or vicious (in the case of low-
performing schools) cycles in which schools find themselves ensnared when 
schemes involving performance-based funding and salaries are implemented. 
In some cases, the schools we analysed also embraced QAE policies as a helpful 
tool for quality improvement and internal management.
The room for action of the schools which opposed new QAE policies 
appeared limited in our research results. Some schools resisted QAE policies 
because they contradicted the school’s educational goals (for example, the Bra-
zilian school which insisted on retaining students) and faced the consequences, 
while others made no attempt at resistance even when they disagreed with 
policies, because they were governed by national regulations. The multiple gov-
ernance tools of local authorities appeared effective in enforcing QAE policies 
in all the schools we observed. However, we also observed that schools could 
practise hidden resistance and to a certain extent avoid QAE tools’ penetration 
of schools’ internal processes.
In revealing the different mechanisms of QAE policies’ local influence, our 
findings raise questions for further investigation. How typical of these and other 
localities are the effects we observed? What conditions authorities’ and schools’ 
selection of specific mechanisms? How are relations between local education 
actors influenced by broader contexts, for example, by local authorities’ degree 
of autonomy from national and sub-national government and that of schools 
from different levels of government, or by national and local governance lega-
cies? Who benefits from QAE policies in different situations? Answers to these 
questions and more would greatly enrich the understanding of local education 
governance through QAE.
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